The Supreme Court handed down judgment in the case of Board of Management of St. Molaga's National School v Secretary Department of education and others [2010] IESC 57 on 23rd November 2010. The case concerned a preliminary decision on an issue being judicially reviewed, involving interpretation of s. 29 of the Education Act 1998 (the 1998 Act).

S. 29 of the 1998 Act provides that where a child has been refused entry to a school, that child’s parents may appeal to the Secretary General, and the appeal will be heard by a committee established under s. 29(2). The procedural considerations are outlined in s. 29(4).

Parents whose children had been refused places at the respondent school had appealed the decisions to the appellant committee. The appeals were allowed by the appellant. The respondent then brought judicial review proceedings before the High Court, which granted orders of certiorari of the decisions. Analysing the 1998 Act, the High Court had determined that there was no statutory provision which could suggest the view that it was intended that a committee established under the legislation could have the right to reverse or make lawfully made management decisions. Jurisdiction was limited to a review of lawfulness/reasonableness of a decision. Against the decisions and orders the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court had erred in law in its interpretation of s. 29 of the 1998 Act.

The Supreme Court framed its objective as one of statutory interpretation, specifically whether the relevant section of the 1998 Act provided the appellant with the jurisdiction to conduct a full hearing of an appeal.

Setting out the relevant sections, the court focused on the word “appeal”. The court determined that the term was not obscure. An appeal was held to be beyond a review of a decision-making process. Finding the words to be clear, it was necessary, in according with the practice of the Oireachtas, to avoid putting an alternative construction on them.

Highlighting s. 29(6), which provides a mechanism whereby an appeal board may make recommendations to the Secretary General as to action to be taken, the court found this must anticipate a full hearing on a matter by an appeal board. The jurisdiction of the appellant could not be limited to a review of a decision.

Allowing the appeal, applying a liberal interpretation to the legislative provision, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the appellant enabled it to conduct a full hearing on appeal and the High Court had incorrectly interpreted the section to limit jurisdiction to a review of lawfulness/reasonableness of the respondent’s decision.