The Supreme Court of Ireland handed down its judgment in the case of Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform v Renner-Dillon [2011] IESC 5 on 11 February 2011. The Court considered whether an order of acquittal is a final judgment within the meaning of section 41(2) of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003.

The appellant had been extradited to the UK by order of the High Court of Ireland (“High Court”) on 16 January 2008 for an offence of rape, an offence to which he pleaded guilty, and was sentenced on 3 June 2008 to a term of imprisonment of nine years. On 17 June 1983 the appellant had been acquitted at Newcastle-upon-Tyne Court of a separate offence of rape alleged to have been committed on 17 December 1982 and forensic samples taken at that time were re-examined during 2005 and 2006. On the basis that this constituted new and compelling evidence and that it was in the public interest that the application should proceed, prosecuting authorities applied to the Court of Appeal of England and Wales (“Court of Appeal”) for an order pursuant to section 76(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to have the appellant’s acquittal quashed and a re-trial ordered. The Court of Appeal, considering the implications of the rule of specialty in that the offence was a wholly different offence to that for which the appellant had been surrendered to the UK, thus adjourned the application to enable the prosecution to bring an application to the High Court of Ireland (“High Court”).

On 25 March 2010 the High Court gave consent pursuant to section 22(7) of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003, holding that it is appropriate to interpret “final judgment” in section 41(2) as not including a judgment of acquittal which can be quashed by a prosecutor’s appeal, particularly where the Court of Appeal has indicated that it will quash the acquittal and order a retrial if the consent of the High Court if forthcoming.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, submitting that until an order was made under section 76(1) quashing the acquittal it must be seen as a final judgment within the meaning of section 41(2).

Mr Justice Finnegan, delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, held that a judgment may be final notwithstanding that it is subject to appeal. When interpreting the provisions of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 the Court is to do so as far as possible in the light of the Council Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings. Applying the European Court of Justice’s judgment in Mantello (Case C-261/09), the Court found that “finally judged” in the Framework Decision had an autonomous meaning in the law of the European Union. Where under the law of the issuing Member State a judgment does not definitely bar further prosecution or “constitute a procedural obstacle to the possible opening or continuation of criminal proceedings in respect of the same acts against that person”, than that person has not been finally judged and such a judgment does not constitute a ground for mandatory non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant.

The Court held that since the acquittal of an appellant does not definitively bar the commencement of further criminal proceedings in respect of the offence by virtue of section 76(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, it could not be said that the appellant had been “finally judged”. Accordingly, the grounds for mandatory non-execution of the European Arrest Warrant in Article 3.2 of the Framework Decision could not apply, and the surrender of the appellant was not prohibited by section 41(1) of the 2003 Act.

The Court thus dismissed the appeal.